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A DEFENCE OF QUASI-REDUCTIONISM 




University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind 
of cognitive achievement and that knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper 
understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to 
some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as 
regards the epistemology of testimonial belief. In particular, it is argued that this conception of 
knowledge motivates a new kind of proposalquasi-reductionismthat can accommodate 
the motivations behind both reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of the epistemology of 
testimony.   
 
 
0. Here are two intuitions that many have regarding knowledge, and which inform much of 
our theorising about knowledge. The firstwhat I will call the achievement intuitionis that 
knowledge is a cognitive achievement of some sort. The secondwhat I will call the anti-
luck intuitionis that knowledge is incompatible with luck. It is tempting to think that these 
intuitions are just two sides of the same coin, or at least that once the intuitions are suitably 
fleshed out then we will come to see that the one intuition is simply an entailment of the 
other. For example, one might hold that achievements by their nature exclude luck in the 
relevant way and thus that the anti-luck intuition is simply a consequence of the achievement 
intuition. As I will show, however, this natural way of thinking about these two intuitions is 
mistaken, and this has important ramifications not only for our understanding of knowledge 
but also for our understanding of specifically testimonial knowledge. Indeed, I will claim that 
the intuition that knowledge is a type of cognitive achievement, while containing (like all 
intuitions) an important truth, is in fact wrong. As we will see, gaining an understanding of 
how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge will lead us to adopt a very 
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specific sort of account of testimonial knowledge, one that captures the motivation behind 
both reductionist and anti-reductionist theories in the epistemology of testimony. The view 
that results is novel, in its motivation if not in its detail. I call this view quasi-reductionism. 
 
 
1. Let us begin by examining the motivation for the achievement intuition. The best way to 
evaluate this intuition is by considering what achievements more generally involve and 
assessing whether knowledge has the same relevant properties. Consider an archer, Archie, 
who selects a target from a range, fires his arrow, and hits the target as intended. Is this an 
achievement? Well, it is certainly a success, but this by itself will not suffice for an 
achievement. For suppose that Archie has no archery abilities and simply hits the target by 
luck. In such a case this would be a success that would not constitute an achievement.  
 Let us suppose, then, that Archie has the relevant archery abilities and is in addition 
successful at hitting the target. Is this enough to ensure an achievement? Perhaps surprisingly, 
the answer to this is ‘no’ since it is essential to achievements that the success in question be 
appropriately related to the ability. Suppose, for example, that this arrow had been blown off 
course by a freak gust of wind and then blown back on course again by a second freak gust of 
wind. In such a case we would have both the ability and success elements of an achievement, 
but not have an achievement because the two elements are not properly related. In particular, 
the success would not have been because of the ability in the appropriate way.1 
 Achievements, then, are successes that are because of ability. How does this relate to 
knowledge? Well, one might think that it is a moral of the post-Gettier literature that 
knowledge is a cognitive achievement in the sense of being a cognitive success (i.e., true 
belief) that is because of cognitive ability. If you form your belief that there is a sheep in the 
field by looking at a big hairy dog, then even if it your belief is true (e.g., there is a sheep in 
the field obscured from view behind the big hairy dog), and even if your belief is formed as a 
result of the relevant abilities (e.g., one is exercising a generally reliable ability to spot sheep 
in these conditions), one still does not count as knowing. The natural explanation of why is 
that one’s cognitive success is not appropriately related to one’s cognitive ability in the sense 
that it is not because of one’s cognitive ability. In the case just described, for example, the 
cognitive success is, if anything, because of the fortuitous detail that there happens to be a 
sheep in the field hidden from view behind the big hairy dog. But if that is the right diagnosis 
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to give of these cases, then the conception of knowledge as cognitive achievement becomes 
irresistibleknowledge just is cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability. 
 Moreover, one might also argue that such a conception of knowledge is able to 
accommodate the anti-luck intuition as well, since one could reasonably claim that it is 
distinctive of achievements that they exclude luck of the relevant sort. Just as Gettier-style 
luck is excluded by the addition of the ‘because of’ relation in the ‘archer’ case, so Gettier-
style epistemic luck is excluded by the addition of this relation in the ‘sheep’ case. There is 
no need, then, for two distinct conditions within one’s theory of knowledge in order to 
accommodate these two intuitions, since a proper rendering of the achievement intuition will 
meet both desiderata. 
  
 
2. This way of thinking of knowledge is now quite widespread, particularly amongst those 
who defend a virtue-theoretic account of knowledge.2 I grant that it is superficially appealing 
and that, if it were true, it would provide an elegant account of knowledge. Unfortunately, 
however, this view is false. In order to see this, consider the following variation on the 
‘archer’ example. Suppose that amongst the targets that Archie selects at random there is only 
one target that does not contain within it a forcefield that would repel any arrow that came 
near it, and suppose that Archie just happens to select this target. Now imagine that 
everything proceeds as before, in that Archie uses his archery abilities to hit the target, is 
successful, and nothing intervenes during the process (there are no freak gusts of wind, for 
example). Archie’s success is thus a product of ability in a non-Gettierized fashion. But is it 
an achievement; that is, is it a success that is because of ability? I think the answer to this is 
‘yes’, even despite the luck involved. After all, Archie’s success was indeed the direct result 
of his ability. 
 This might initially sound odd, and I think the reason for this is that the previous 
discussion of Archie’s achievement made it sound as if the very notion of an achievement 
was luck-excluding, in the sense that it ought not to be possible for Archie’s lucky success in 
this case to count as an achievement. Notice, however, that the luck involved earlier and the 
luck involved now are very different. The first kind of luck is of the ‘intervening’ sort that 
you find in Gettier-style cases, in that it is a luck that intervenes between ability and success, 
albeit in such a way that the success is preserved. In contrast, the luck involved in this case is 
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of an ‘environmental’ form, in that rather than intervening between ability and success it 
instead concerns the environment in which ability generates that success. What we have 
discovered is that while achievements are incompatible with intervening luck, they are 
compatible with environmental luck. 
 This discovery is disastrous for the thesis that knowledge should be understood as a 
specific kind of achievement because knowledge is incompatible with both kinds of luck. In 
order to see this, consider the case of Barney who, using his highly reliable cognitive 
abilities, forms a true belief that there is a barn in front of him. Suppose further that there is 
no Gettier-style luck in this case, in that nothing intervenes between his cognitive abilities 
and his cognitive success (Barney really does see a barn). Barney’s cognitive success is thus 
because of his cognitive ability, and hence he has exhibited a cognitive achievement. 
Nevertheless, Barney lacks knowledge and the reason for this is that there is environmental 
luck in play. In particular, although Barney is indeed looking at a real barn just now, he is in 
barn façade county in which most of the barn-shaped objects are in fact fakes, undetectable to 
the naked eye. Because he is in such an epistemically unfriendly environment, his belief is 
only luckily true even despite the presence of his cognitive abilities, and hence he lacks 
knowledge.3 
 The immediate upshot of this case is that sometimes there is more to knowledge than 
a mere cognitive achievement. A further implication is that the anti-luck intuition comes 
apart from the achievement intuition, since Barney lacks knowledge in this case precisely 
because his belief is only luckily true. More generally, we can conclude that achievements 
only exclude one sort of malignant epistemic luckthat of the intervening varietybut leave 
a second type of malignant epistemic luckthat of the environmental varietyuntouched. I 
have argued elsewhere that the best way of understanding the anti-luck constraint on 
knowledge is in terms of a ‘safety’ condition, a condition which demands, in essence, that 
one’s belief could not have easily be wrong.4 As we have just seen, however, there are (at 
least) two ways in which a belief can be unsafe and so not count as a case of knowledge, and 




3. So there are cases of cognitive achievement that are not cases of knowledge, and hence the 
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thesis that knowledge is to be understood as a cognitive achievement is false. Interestingly, 
this is not the only problem facing this thesis, since there are also cases in which agents have 
knowledge and yet do not exhibit cognitive achievements.   
 Consider the case of Jennifer.5 Jennifer steps off the train in an unfamiliar city and 
goes up to the first person that she meets and asks for directions to a local landmark. Let us 
stipulate that the person that she speaks to has first-hand knowledge of the area and 
communicates what she knows to Jennifer, who subsequently heads off to her intended 
destination.  
Many will have the intuition that Jennifer can gain knowledge in this case. Indeed, if 
she is unable to gain knowledge in this case then a great deal of what we presently take 
ourselves to know is under threat since it is gained in a similar trusting fashion. Interestingly, 
however, whatever else we might want to say about this case we surely do not want to say 
that Jennifer’s cognitive success represents a cognitive achievement on her part, since her 
cognitive abilities only played a minimal role in this knowledge acquisition. Her informant 
exhibits a cognitive achievement in knowing what she does about her town, and we might say 
that Jennifer’s cognitive success is therefore down to her and thus her achievement. But we 
certainly wouldn’t say that it was Jennifer’s achievement. 
 It is worth being clear about the nature of this claim. The thesis is not, for example, 
that Jennifer’s abilities played no role in the acquisition of this knowledge, which is the 
conclusion that some draw from this sort of case.6 After all, although it is true that Jennifer 
asked the first person that she met, I think we are implicitly assuming here that she is at least 
counterfactually sensitive to the issue of who would count as a good informant. For example, 
if the person she met were clearly a tourist, or a small child, or someone who was manifestly 
insane, then we would expect her to move on to another potential informant. Moreover, I take 
it that we are also assuming that Jennifer is at least counterfactually sensitive to relevant 
defeaters. If, for example, the informant were to give her directions which were clearly 
falsee.g., directions which sent her out of town, even though she knew that the landmark 
she is looking for is in townthen we would expect her to spot this and therefore treat the 
testimony with caution. The claim, then, is not that Jennifer’s cognitive success is not due to 
her cognitive abilities at allindeed, I think it is essential that we need to read the example in 
such a way that Jennifer’s abilities are relevantly in play in order to maintain the intuition that 
she gains knowledge in this casebut simply that this cognitive success is not because of her 
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cognitive abilities, and so not a cognitive achievement.  
 We can illustrate this point by considering again the case of Archie. Suppose that this 
time Archie gets some help from an expert archer. Archie himself, while having some 
archery-relevant abilitiesgood eyesight, good hand-to-eye co-ordination etc.,has never 
fired an arrow before, and so needs help from the expert archer if he is to hit the target. Let us 
suppose, then, that the expert archer stands behind Archie and assists him in pulling back the 
arrow, taking aim, holding his arm steady as he fires, and so on. Now suppose that Archie is 
successful in that he hits the target. Clearly, his abilities have played a role in this success, 
but the crucial question is whether they have played a sufficient role that this success would 
count as a success that was because of his abilities, and so a cognitive achievement on his 
part. I think it is clear that this is not the case. If anything, the cognitive achievement is down 
to the expert helper, or at least the collaborative efforts of Archie and the expert helper, but it 
is certainly not an achievement of Archie’s.  
So sometimes there is less to knowledge than a cognitive achievement. Interestingly, 
notice that in the case of Jennifer, while the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement 
is not satisfied, the thesis that knowledge entails safe belief is satisfied. For notice that if 
Jennifer were in an environment which was epistemically unfriendlyif, for example, nearly 
all of the potential informants were out to deceive herthen she would not be able to gain 
knowledge from her informant in this way, even if the informant she happened to chance to 
upon was indeed trustworthy. So while we have seen that the thesis that knowledge is a 
cognitive achievement is unsustainable, the thesis that knowledge entails safe true belief is 
not under threat.  
 
 
4. I think that a key moral we should draw from the Barney and Jennifer cases is that we need 
to understand the achievement intuition in a much weaker fashion to how it is usually 
presented. In particular, I think the underlying thought here is not that knowledge is always a 
cognitive achievement, but rather that it is in the nature of knowledge that it be due in 
significant part to the relevant cognitive abilities of the agent, albeit not necessarily to an 
extent that the knowledge that results always constitutes cognitive achievement.  
 Moreover, a further moral we should draw is that it is essential to knowledge that it 
involves a safe true belief. We have already seen that it is mistaken to try to ‘beef-up’ the 
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ability requirement on knowledge, such that knowledge is identified with cognitive 
achievement, in order to capture this anti-luck constraint on knowledge since even the more 
robust ability requirement is unable to eliminate all types of malignant epistemic luck and, in 
any case, there are instances of knowledge in which the more robust ability requirement is 
not met. Moreover, it should also be clear that it would be mistaken to try to treat the anti-
luck requirement as capturing any need for an ability condition, since a belief with all the 
necessary modal properties to satisfy the anti-luck condition but which is not formed through 
ability would not count as knowledge.  
For example, suppose I form my beliefs simply by guesswork, but imagine that there 
is an evil demon of some variety whose job it is to ensure that every time I form a belief the 
world is adjusted so that my belief is true. In such a case, my true belief could not easily have 
been wrong, and thus it would be safe. Nevertheless, this clearly would not suffice for 
knowledge. The reason for this is that my cognitive success in no way relates to my cognitive 
ability. Indeed, I am not being responsive to the facts at all, but rather the facts are being 
responsive to me.    
This suggests that the right account of knowledge is one in which we have both a 
safety requirement and an ability requirement, albeit where the latter can impose a relatively 
modest epistemic demand, consistent with the knowledge possessed by Jennifer in the case 
described above.7  
 
 
5. I want to suggest that this picture of how we should think about knowledge has some 
important implications for testimonial knowledge. As is familiar, the debate regarding the 
epistemology of testimonial belief has tended to cluster around two opposing positions, 
reductionism and credulism. The motivation for the former view is that testimony cannot be a 
source of knowledge all by itself, and thus that the epistemic standing of testimonial belief 
must be traceable back to non-testimonial sources, like observation. The motivation for 
credulism, in contrast, is the thought that reductionism places an unduly austere demand on 
testimonial belief and thus that it is essential that we allow that in at least some cases one can 
gain testimonial knowledge even though the reductionist requirement on testimonial 
knowledge is not met. 
The debate regarding how we should best draw this distinction is messy at best, but 
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we do not need to pass judgement on this debate here.8 Instead, for our purposes we can be at 
least partly stipulative regarding how the distinction should be drawn. With this in mind, I 
will characterise reductionism as follows: 
 
Reductionism 
S has testimonial knowledge that p only if the epistemic standing of S’s true belief that p is entirely 
recoverable in non-testimonial terms.  
 
Furthermore, we will define credulism as follows: 
 
Credulism 
There exist cases in which S has testimonial knowledge that p and yet no part of the epistemic 
standing of S’s true belief that p is due to non-testimonial factors.  
 
While these formulations are stipulative, and will certainly fail to capture many of the 
positions in play in the debate regarding the epistemology of testimony, they do capture what 
I claim is the fundamental motivation for each view. In particular, the formulation of 
reductionism captures the fundamental motivation for reductionism that testimony is not 
itself a source of epistemic support. In contrast, the formulation of credulism captures the 
fundamental motivation for credulism that there exist cases in which an agent has testimonial 
knowledge and yet lacks any independent (i.e., non-testimonial) epistemic support for the 
target belief.  
It should be clear that the account of knowledge under discussion here, which 
incorporates both an anti-luck and an ability requirement, does not naturally fall into either of 
these categories. Take the case of Jennifer described above. At first pass, one might 
characterise this example as offering support for the credulist thesis, in that Jennifer has 
testimonial knowledge and yet she has no independent epistemic support for her belief. 
Appearances are deceptive, however, in that we have already noted that Jennifer’s abilities 
are being brought to bear here. Moreover, the epistemic support provided to the belief by 
those abilities is clearly at least in part non-testimonial. For example, we credit her with 
knowledge in this case because, as noted above, she has a rough-and-ready ability to tell who 
would be a poor informant in this regard (e.g., a child, a tourist, etc.,), and it is hard to see 
how an ability of this sort could be exclusively grounded in testimony that Jennifer has 
received.  
That is, insofar as this is indeed a case in which would instinctively ascribe 
knowledge to Jennifer, then I take it that we would treat Jennifer as having all sort of 
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background information which is guiding these abilities, background information which 
cannot plausibly be completely gained via further testimony. For instance, Jennifer surely 
knows that small children are a poor source of geographical testimony, and the epistemic 
basis for this belief is almost certainly personal experience. Of course, for each element of the 
background information we can imagine a way in which this element was gained via further 
testimony without this threatening the epistemic standing of Jennifer’s testimonial belief. The 
point, however, is that to imagine that the entire background was gained in this way is to 
imagine a very different agent to the one that we suppose is active in this example. Moreover, 
we would not intuitively treat this agent as having knowledge.  
Indeed, in order to bring this point into sharper relief, let us imagine that what 
Jennifer is trying to find out is not directions in an unfamiliar town, but rather the answer to 
the question of what ‘Il pleut’ means. Her situation is one of complete ignorance. She does 
not have any idea of what this phrase might mean, nor even what language it is in. Moreover, 
she is dropped in an unfamiliar place and given no information about the people who occupy 
this region. Furthermore, just for good measure, all the people in that region are disguised 
such that there is no way for Jennifer to know what sort of person she is talking to, young or 
old, male or female, etc. Suppose now that Jennifer asks the first person she meets for an 
answer to her question and this person, knowledgeable about the French language, informs 
her that the phrase means ‘It’s raining’. While looking for further support for this, she asks 
others, but they simply tell her that what the original informant told her was right.  
I take it that no-one believes that Jennifer can gain knowledge in this case, and what is 
significant about the scenario for our purposes is that we have a case in which Jennifer is 
unable to bring her relevant cognitive abilities to bear but must instead rest content with her 
belief’s epistemic support being entirely testimonial. Clearly, however, support of this sort is 
inadequate to the task by itself, and this demonstrates that the operation of Jennifer’s ability 
in the usual formulation of the case implicitly brings into the picture non-testimonial support 
for Jennifer’s belief in the target proposition.  
More generally, the point is this: knowledge on my view entails the operation of the 
relevant cognitive abilities, but the operation of the relevant cognitive abilities in the case of 
testimony entails that one’s belief enjoys at least some non-testimonial epistemic support. 
The account of knowledge on offer is thus straightforwardly incompatible with credulism as 
defined above.  
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Notice, however, that the account of knowledge on offer here, while incompatible 
with credulism, does not lend support to reductionism either. Indeed, it is incompatible with 
this thesis too. After all, there is no reason why this account of knowledge should insist that 
the epistemic support enjoyed by a belief that counts as testimonial knowledge should be 
entirely recoverable in non-testimonial terms. Perhaps, for example, the agent’s cognitive 
ability to detect bad informants in this environment is in part acquired via testimony (e.g., by 
people telling her who to trust on this score). So long as the true belief in question is 
appropriately related to the agent’s relevant cognitive abilities, and so long as it is in addition 
safe, then it qualifies as knowledge, even if a full reduction of the epistemic support of that 
belief to non-testimonial sources in unavailable.  
 
 
6. The conception of testimonial knowledge that results is, I think, entirely in accordance 
with intuition. Moreover, it can accommodate the guiding motivations behind both 
reductionist and credulist views in the epistemology of testimony. On the one hand, the view 
can allow cases in which the agent’s cognitive abilities play a fairly minimal role in the 
acquisition of the knowledge, as in the case of Jennifer. Moreover, it can also capture the 
reductionist thought that testimony by itself is not a suitable source of knowledge. 
Indeed, I think this account of knowledge can offer a neat diagnosis of why different 
conceptions of testimonial knowledge seem to place such different demands on what such 
knowledge involves. For notice that the reason why we are so sanguine about allowing 
Jennifer knowledge in the original case described above is precisely because the environment 
is so friendly. As a result, it is very easy for her to meet the anti-luck constraint on knowledge 
and, therefore, she need not exhibit very much in terms of cognitive ability in order to be 
counted as having knowledge. If the environment had been more unfriendly, howeverif, for 
example, there had been a number of potential informants in the area who would have given 
false informationthen I take it that we would not be nearly so quick to ascribe knowledge 
to Jennifer. The explanation for this, I suggest, is that meeting the anti-luck condition in this 
case would involve far more input from Jennifer, and thus it would be much harder for her to 
have knowledge (i.e., she would need to draw more on the successful operation of her 
relevant cognitive abilities). 
Moreover, the reason why we do not ascribe knowledge in cases where the epistemic 
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support for the agent’s belief is entirely testimonial is that we have a strong intuition that 
knowledge is in part at least the product of cognitive ability, and yet we implicitly recognise 
that there is no sense to be made of cases in which an agent uses her cognitive abilities in 
order to gain testimonial knowledge and yet the belief that results enjoys only testimonial 
epistemic support.   
It is an interesting question, however, how we should describe the view that results 
given that it does not fall into either the reductionist or the credulist camp as we have defined 
these positions above. For my part, I favour quasi-reductionism as the best description of the 
view, since I take it that what is core to the proposal is that some form of reduction is 
required for testimonial knowledge (that said, it would not, I think, be misleading to call the 
view quasi-credulism). Since the original characterisation of the reductionism/credulism 
dispute was partly stipulative, however, it is worth closing by saying a little more about 
where quasi-reductionism stands within the general geography of the contemporary debate 
regarding the epistemology of testimony. 
 
  
7. One issue that is important here is that often in the debate between reductionism and 
credulism the respective points made by either side are essentially expressed in terms of non-
testimonial grounds that the agent is able to cite in favour of her belief, with reductionism 
demanding such non-testimonial grounds and credulism allowing testimonial knowledge in 
the absence of non-testimonial grounds. If one thinks that the possession of citable non-
testimonial grounds is the decisive factor in whether one’s view counts as credulist, then the 
view I am proposing here is a kind of credulism. After all, Jennifer could well be unable to 
actually offer non-testimonial grounds in favour of her belief, and yet I still want to count that 
belief as being an instance of knowledge.  
I think, however, that characterising the distinction between reductionism and 
credulism in terms of citableand thus, presumably, reflectively accessiblegrounds is not 
particularly helpful since it is too closely ties the distinction to a specifically epistemic 
internalist demand for reflectively accessible grounds, rather than being agnostic (as it should 
be) on the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction. 
Another issue that is important here is how the reductionist/credulist distinction plays 
out as regards epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge. After all, the characterisation 
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of this distinction offered above is specifically cast in terms of testimonial knowledge. 
Clearly, however, one can imagine parallel views as regards weaker epistemic standings. For 
example, one might claim that one’s testimonial belief can enjoy a positive epistemic 
standing, possibly even a justification, even in the absence of any non-testimonial epistemic 
support, while nonetheless denying that such a positive epistemic standing would suffice for 
testimonial knowledge. This would thus be a kind of credulism, albeit a weaker thesis to the 
view described above. 
I think this is an important distinction to make, one that is actually quite useful for my 
purposes since it enhances the irenic credentials of my view. For notice that, in effect, quasi-
reductionism about testimonial knowledge allows that some form of positive epistemic 
standing may be traceable to entirely testimonial support, and thus accords with the weak 
form of credulism. What it denies is simply the more robustand therefore less 
intuitiveformulation of credulism which allows that testimonial knowledge can be 
possessed even in the absence of any non-testimonial epistemic support. Again, then, we find 
that quasi-reductionism can accommodate credulist intuitions. 
 
 
8. It is my contention that reflecting on the nature of knowledge reveals that it imposes two 
distinct demands, one that is to be understood in terms of cognitive ability, and one that is to 
be understood in terms of safety. Bringing this conclusion to bear on the topic of the 
epistemology of testimonial belief highlights a new way of thinking about testimonial 
knowledge. This viewwhich I have here christened quasi-reductionismcan accommodate 
the motivations behind both reductionist and credulist proposals and therefore help us to see a 





Greco, J. (2002). ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives 
from Ethics and Epistemology, (eds.) M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 (2007). ‘The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge’, typescript.  
 (Forthcominga). ‘The Value Problem’, The Value of Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock, 
A. Millar, & D. H. Pritchard, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
 13 
 (Forthcomingb). ‘What’s Wrong With Contextualism?’, The Philosophical Quarterly. 
Kvanvig, J. (Forthcoming). ‘Responses’, The Value of Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock, A. 
Millar, & D. H. Pritchard, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Lackey, J. (2007). ‘Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’, Synthese 156. 
Lackey, J., & Sosa, E. (eds.) (2006). The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Pritchard, D. H. (2002). ‘Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic’, International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 283-307.  
 (2004). ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophical Issues (supplement to Noûs) 
14, 326-48. 
 (2005). Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 (2006). ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries’, New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) V. F. 
Hendricks & D. H. Pritchard, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 (2007a). ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Synthese 156. 
 (2007b). ‘The Value of Knowledge’, typescript.  
  (Forthcominga). ‘Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly. 
 (Forthcomingb). ‘Knowledge, Understanding, and Epistemic Value’, Epistemology 
(Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O’Hear, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK.  
 (Forthcomingc). ‘Sosa On Epistemic Value’, Philosophical Studies. 
Sosa, E. (1999). ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141-
54. 
  (2007). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the 
Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 (1999). ‘What is Knowledge?’, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, (eds.) J. Greco 





1  ‘Because of’ is here to be read in causal-explanatory terms. This raises a number of technical issues about how 
best to understand this relation that I have not the space to explore further here. For discussion of this topic, see 
Greco (2007; forthcomingb) and Pritchard (forthcominga).  
2  This position is most explicit in recent work by Greco (e.g., 2002; 2007; forthcominga; forthcomingb), though 
the impetus for such a view is clearly earlier work by Sosa. For more on Sosa’s view in this regard, see 
especially Sosa (2007). See also Zagzebski (1996; 1999).  
3  I explore the problem posed by barn façade-style cases for the thesis that knowledge should be identified with 
cognitive achievement further elsewhere. See Pritchard (2007b; forthcominga; forthcomingb; forthcomingc). 
Kvanvig (forthcoming) makes a similar point. For a discussion of some possible lines of response to this type of 
objection, see Greco (2007; forthcominga; forthcomingb). 
4  For more on safety, see Sosa (2000) and Pritchard (2002; 2005, ch. 6; 2006; 2007a). 
5  What follows is a variation of a case offered by Lackey (2007). 
6  This is the conclusion drawn by Lackey (2007), for example. 





8  I discuss the debate regarding how the distinction should be drawn in more detail in Pritchard (2004). The 
literature on the reductionism/credulism distinction in the epistemology of testimony is now so vast that it 
would take us too far afield to present a survey of the various positions. For an excellent overview of the 
contemporary debate, see Lackey & Sosa (2006).   
9  Thanks to Daniel O’Brien for feedback on an earlier version of this paper.  
